HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD

BY

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FOREWORD

I knew when I was flattered into acceptance of the high honour of being President of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, that I should soon be called upon to perform the difficult tasks of the office, and that then would begin the process of wringing the hands. Here I am now, having to present to the world of scholars a booklet of Mm. Kuppuswami Sastri on *The Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit,* and not quite knowing how. The late Mahamahopadhyaya was master of both branches of learning, the Sastras and the Kavyas, and could teach on the highest level the secrets of both. In fact, the great classic on the topic of *dhvani,* which could be found only in obscure and inaccurate texts, was by him first examined with care and given to the world in a correct edition. Of the labour that he bestowed on the rescue and elucidation of this authoritative treatise and of kindred labours in the department of poetics, *The Highways and Byways* may be said to be the ripe fruit. It surveys with the minute and far-going vision of a master all the problems that beset the path of a critic who is bent on reaching the citadel of poetic excellence. How lucky he must be to be conducted in this exalted quest by a guide of keen insight and rare renown ! And the way he takes you is not monotonous or thorny, but divagates into twenty different branches, giving picturesque views and glorious examples of the noble art of poesy. To the young adventurer who would learn how to appraise and enjoy the work of a real *kavi,* I would say with confidence: " Enter here, you shall have reward you never dreamt of."

V. S. SRINIVASA SASTRI,
President,
The K. S. R. I., Madras.

THESE Lectures were delivered by Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri under the auspices of the Annamalai University on 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th January, 1931.

The authorities of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute are thankful to Sri G. K. Seshagiri, son of the late Professor, for presenting to the Institute the Manuscript Notes and Typescript Copies of these lectures.

The following scholars were in charge of this publication : Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, Dr. T. R. Chintamani, Prof. T. Chandrasekhara Dikshitar, and Dr. V. Raghavan.

ERRATA

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Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit

FIRST LECTURE

Friends—I introduce myself as one who happens to be one of the friends of the Hon'ble Founder of this University and I also introduce myself as a humble votary of Indian culture and the Indian science and philosophy of literary criticism in Sanskrit. When I was called upon to undertake the academic duty of delivering a short course of lectures under the auspices of this University, I gladly agreed, mainly for the reason that I expected it would afford me an opportunity to meet almost a family of friends with whom I happen to be intimately connected as former colleague or as former teacher.

From the notification, you must have had some idea of the title which I propose to give to this short course—"Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit". I cannot more appropriately inaugurate this short course than by quoting myself:—

" परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।
कविताबुधयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोर्यथा ॥"

"To the *Śivā-śiva synthesis,* to the *mother-father* synthesis, to the *woman-man* synthesis, I pay homage; just in the same spirit and in the same breath, I do homage to the synthesis of *poesy* and *criticism,* of *charm* and *response,* of *genius* and *taste,* of *poet* and *critic,* of *kavi* and *sahṛdaya.*"

In this invocation, which I composed and prefixed to my Sanskrit work called Upalocana* and which I have introduced at the beginning of this course of lectures, I am not merely following the trodden track of an old-world votary of Indian culture. I am also throwing out some hint in which some of you at least may find the meaning, nature and scope of the theme of the short course of four lectures which I propose to deliver to you. Recently, I happened to mention to one of my friends, the title of the course of lectures which I propose to deliver under the auspices of this University; and as I expected, he remarked it seemed to him an intriguing title. I hope it will not be an intriguing title to you and I hope I shall be able to persuade you to believe that it is not only suggestive but it is also appropriate.

Let me make my ideas somewhat clear by saying a word about the two terms '*highways*' and '*byways*' which I use in the title. I am using them in their ordinary sense. By '*highway*' I

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* See the beginning of the Upalocana, by Mahāmahōpādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastri on Abhinavagupta's Locana—Part I of the edition of Dhvanyāloka, with Locana, Kaumudī and Upalocana, published by the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras.

understand a public way, a well-known way which one might follow in order to reach some definite aim or some fixed goal; and the word *'byway'* is used here deliberately in the sense in which it is ordinarily used and you may associate with it all its implications. It refers to something which may be subsidiary, which may be a sort of side-track, which may be a by-road, which may also be in a sense a short route or a secret route,—a route that is always subordinate to the highway. By examining the literature in Sanskrit bearing on the principles of literary criticism, you can easily distinguish some important highways and some important byways.

To understand the theories and ways of literary criticism, one should understand its scope, its aim, its chief function. The popular view of the function of literary criticism, more especially literary criticism in Sanskrit, is very defective. You may feel what Sanskrit writers have called literary criticism cannot at best rise above the level of what one might easily characterise as dogmatic criticism. Alaṅkāra śāstra is commonly believed to be a branch of knowledge which deals with figures of speech. Understood in this narrow sense, one might easily say that literary criticism in Sanskrit is at best dogmatic criticism which is tradition-ridden and convention-ridden. It does not help you really to get close to the heart of the work of art which one might desire to reach. That is one way of looking at the matter. But those who are somewhat intimately acquainted with Sanskrit litera-

ture know that this is not the correct view. The word *alaṅkāra* should be understood in its wider sense. Vāmana explains the term *alaṅkāra* to mean *saundarya,* beauty or literary charm in general. In the light of what Vāmana has said*, we suggest an amended name for this *śāstra, saundarya śāstra,* or even in a more technical fashion, *rasa śāstra.* Could this be all right? But this involves certainly another danger. It involves the danger of associating literary criticism with certain metaphysical aspects of Aesthetics; it involves the danger of making you stray away far into metaphysical speculations on art.

Modern students of literary criticism, with special reference to alien literatures, like the English literature, are familiar with certain methods of literary criticism such as historical criticism and biographical criticism; and we know that, recently, at least in some quarters, these ways of literary criticism have not been received well. Historical criticism is felt to be defective in this way, that it takes you away from the work of art and makes you move along an inartistic path, investigating the artist's environment, his age, his race and the poetic school to which he belonged. This method is helpful in certain directions; it is fruitful, it is helpful, as a corrective; but it must be kept within certain limits. What is the position of biographical criticism? That also makes you stray away from the

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* " सौन्दर्यमलंकार: "—Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra I. i, 2.

work of art and forces you to work on the biography of the poet; and sometimes, when you have not got satisfactory details, you have to work on unsatisfactory biographies, and in that way, your judgment is likely to become clouded by many irrelevant considerations.

But there is another way of literary criticism recognised by moders critics, that is sometimes described as the neo-criticism. It does not look upon the critic as a judge who is to pronounce judgments but looks upon him as " a sensitive soul detailing his adventures among masterpieces of art". The neo-critics are, in one word, the critics of the impressionistic school. A great writer* remarks that impressionism and dogmatism may be described as the two sexes of criticism. I hope they may not turn out to be the two warring sexes of criticism, as the two sexes happen to be in certain spheres, in these days. The neo-critic's way may be described thus in the words of Carlyle: " Criticism has assumed a new form in Germany. It proceeds on other principles and proposes to itself a higher aim. The main question is not now a question concerning the qualities of diction, the coherence of metaphors, the fitness of metaphors, the fitness of sentiments, the general logical truth in a work of art, as it was some half century ago among most critics; neither is it a question mainly of a psychological sort to be answered by discovering

* J. E. Spingarn. See his " The New Criticism ", New York, 1911.

and delineating the peculiar nature of the poet from his poetry, as is usual with the best of our own critics at present; but it is, not indeed exclusively, but inclusively of its two other questions, properly and ultimately a question of the essence and peculiar life of the poetry itself . . . The problem is not now to determine by what mechanism Addison composed sentences and struck out similitudes, but by what far finer and more mysterious mechanism Shakespeare organised his dramas and gave life and individuality to his Ariel and his Hamlet. Wherein lies that life; how have they attuned that shape and individuality? Whence comes that empyrean fire which irradiates their whole being and appears at least in starry gleams? Are these dramas of his not veri-similar only, but true; nay, truer than reality itself, since the essence of unmixed reality is bodied forth in them under more expressive similes? What is this unity of pleasures; and can our deeper inspection discern it to be indivisible and existing by necessity because each work springs as it were from the general elements of thought and grows up therefrom into form and expansion by its own growth? Not only who was the poet and how did he compose; but what and how was the poem, and why was it a poem and not rhymed eloquence, creation and not figured passion? These are the questions for the critic".* This is the neo-critic's way and this is recommended enthusiastically in the twentieth century by certain exponents of neo-criticism and it is recommended

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* Quoted by J. E. Spingarn in his "The New Criticism."

particularly with a view to removing the antipathy which has come to be accentuated between the exponents of the creative art and art-criticism.

This adverse attitude towards criticism is mainly due to the divorce which came to be established between the two as a result of certain misapprehensions between the creative side of art and the function of criticism. But there is no real divorce between the creative side of art and criticism and there is no real ground for any such divorce. If we remember what Croce has to say with reference to the fundamental doctrine on which criticism has been based, it is easy for us to realise why it would be unreasonable to recognise any sort of divorce between criticism and creation. "We should dethrone the concept that all art is expression; we should come to the conclusion that all expression is art".* This is the corner stone of neo-criticism; this is the main doctrine, the main text of the sermons of the neo-critics; this is the fundamental doctrine on which neo-criticism is based.

Exponents of neo-criticism in the West are described as impressionistic critics, and impressionistic criticism is not without its disadvantages. It may be said against it that a critic of the impressionistic school thrusts *himself,* his own *personality,* his own *ego,* more than necessary upon the view of the readers, and upon the view of those who would like to appreciate the work of art. He seeks to substitute himself in place of the poet,

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* *Cf.* Spingarn, 'The New Criticism', p. 19.

in place of the work of art. But the neo-critic may say that this is better than substituting history or metaphysics or politics or biography. At least it may be said in favour of the neo-critic's position, in favour of his impressionistic school, that he endeavours to re-dream the poet's dream, to re-live his life and it may be said in his favour that he strives to replace one work of art by another. This is the central idea in neo-criticism:—that "*art* can find its *alter-ego* (other self) only in art"*. If creation is art, criticism is also art. If creation is one aspect of art, criticism is another aspect or another phase of art. They are different phases of the same, the one being the inner phase, the other, the outer. A misanthropic philosopher, one who had a keen shrewd philosophic insight, I mean the great Schopenhauer, describes criticism as "the feminine aspect of creation". Students of the impressionstic school of criticism will find in this a somewhat distorted view of the science and art of criticism. It would be more correct to say that *genius* and *taste* are inseparable phases of the same art; it may be more correct to say that poetic *genius* and *taste* are related to each other as *woman* and *man*.

In the history of Sanskrit literature, particularly that portion of Sanskrit literature which deals with the principles of criticism—and this goes back to a distant antiquity—one cannot see anything like a pronounced antipathy against critics nor against poets. Taking the general trend of Sans-

* Springarn, 'The New Criticism', p. 6.

krit literature at any stage, I believe, one cannot see anything like an attempt to divorce criticism from creation or creation from criticism. Like Plato who banished poetry from his republic, the Mīmāṁsakas and the orthdox Vaidikas might say—"*Kavyālā pāṁśca varjayet*". These are but aberrations from the normal, even though they are great in other phases of learning. Excepting these very stray cases, our history does not show any divorce, does not show any attempt at divorce between critics and poets.

The oldest phase of literary appreciation may be traced back to the Ṛgveda. It is not meant to suggest that the Ṛgvedic bard was conscious of his position as a critic; yet it is quite possible that the bards were also critics without being conscious of it. In a God-filled or God-intoxicated state of mind, from the pure fountain of their heart, the Ṛks flowed and some of them suggest certain ideas about critics almost in the same vein. Compare that Ṛk

उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम् ।
उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसस्रे जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः ॥

VIII. ii. 23. 4.

Poesy reveals hereself only to him who understands her. It is not the critic that praises the poet here, but the poet that praises the critic. What we may ordinarily expect is that poets, not infrequently, take such an attitude towards their productions, as is very similar to that of parents towards their

children. They do not like their works to be criticised and criticised adversely. Ripe poets are ripe critics; only such writers are not too many. In the Ṛk quoted above, we have the Vedic bard appreciating the critic.

Now we shall take a leap to the Epics, though the leap is very big. We are told that Vālmīki is the Ādikavi. Vālmīki is regarded as the first genuine poet; it was he who first indicated to the world the lines on which Indian poesy should proceed and indicated to the world how to appreciate Indian poetry and to understand the fundamentals of Indian poetry. The story describing the origin of the Rāmāyaṇa is known to all.

पादबद्धोऽक्षरसमः तन्त्रीलयसमन्वितः ।
शोकार्तस्य प्रवृत्तो मे श्लोको भवतु नान्यथा ॥

Rāmāyaṇa, I. 2. 18.

Read again the chapter that tells us this story and we shall find that in Vālmīki, the creative artist and the art-critic were rolled up and harmoniously blended into one. In a spontaneous way a beautiful poem emanates from the fountain of his pathos-filled heart, and he proceeds to bestow some thought upon the verse and he pauses and appreciates the verse. One would think that the closing part of the chapter is prosaic, but it has a clear lesson to convey to the world. The creative side of his genius did its work side by side with the critical side and he played the role of a critic. The spontaneous emanation of his pathos-filled heart blooms into

sweet poetry. Note Śoka is itself Śloka. The Śoka-Śloka equation has played a very great part in the history of Alaṅkāra literature and in the theory of literary criticism in Sanskrit; it has formed a source of inspiration to the poets and authors of the Dhvani school of criticism. A fruitful doctrine of literary criticism came to be enunciated as the result of the inspiration derived from this Śoka-Śloka equation. It was an equation which attracted the attention of Kālidāsa, which he did not choose to ignore.

तामभ्यगच्छद्रुदितानुसारी कविः कुशेध्माहरणाय यातः ।
निषादविद्धाण्डजदर्शनोत्थः श्लोकत्वमापद्यत यस्य शोकः ॥

Raghuvaṁśa, XIV. 70.

It is clear that the great poet was responsible for advocating a wholesome and harmonious unification of the two phases of art, namely creation and criticism.

Then let us come down to a later stage. Let us see what the prince of Indian poets, what Kālidāsa has to say. In a simple way devoid of all embellishment, and in his own characteristically telling manner, in a very appropriate situation, he makes the same observation and lays down the same fundamental position; says he:

आ परितोषाद्विदुषां न साधु मन्ये प्रयोगविज्ञानम् ।
बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

Abhijñānaśākuntala, Prastāvanā.

This is a beautiful homage that the greatest artist of India pays to the art-critic. Now by this time, can we not realise that the underlying idea which influenced all these statements was something like this: Art can only find its *alter-ego* in art-criticism. The creative art can only find its other self in the art of criticism, not in the science of criticism.

Let us see what some of the oldest Ālaṅkārikas have to say. It is accepted generally that Bhāmaha is the oldest Ālaṅkārika, the oldest at least among those whose works have come down to us. Says he:

नाकवित्वमधर्माय व्याधये दण्डनाय वा ।
कुकवित्वं पुनस्स्साक्षान्मृतिमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥

Kāvyālaṅkāra, I. 12.

Not to be a poet certainly is not a sin, nor does it make one fall ill or liable to punishment. But what about being a bad poet or bad artist? Not to be an artist, not to make poetry is sufficiently bad; to mar poetry, to injure art, to be a bad artist, it is death itself. As a panacea for *kukavitva,* Bhāmaha recommends a careful study of the principles of literary criticism. He himself was not merely a great critic, but was also a great poet. The next great figure in the field is Daṇḍin, probably a younger contemporary of Bhāmaha. He also emphasises the same idea in the verse:—

किमन्धस्याधिकारोऽस्ति रूपभेदोपलब्धिषु ।

Kāvyādarśa, I. 8.

It is not only the importance and value of criticism, but the underlying unity of the two aspects of the poetic art that he emphasises. The two aspects are but different phases of the same thing. The same attitude is emphasised by Rājaśekhara, the great poet and critic, who was characterised by a massive intellect and whose writings reveal its massiveness as well as its perversity. He is perhaps a younger contemporary of Ānandavardhana and certainly an elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta. A work of his, Kāvya-mīmāṁsā, published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, contains some very interesting matter, more especially in his discussion of the nature and value of Pratibhā.

Bhāvakatva represents literary appreciation. Creation and criticism are naturally dependent; they form a single unit which has two phases.

सा (प्रतिभा) च द्विधा कारयित्री भावयित्री च ।

कवेरुपकुर्वाणा कारयित्री । * * *

भावकस्य उपकुर्वाणा भावयित्री । * * *

कः पुनरनयोर्भेदो यत्कविर्भावयति, भावकश्च कविः इत्याचार्याः । Kāvyamīmāṁsā, pp. 12-13.

We are familiar with gold and the touch-stone. When it so happens that both these are of the same substance, it becomes wonderful. The older names of the science are misleading. One may find appropriate names in such terms as Kāvyāloka, Kāvyādarśa, Kāvyadarpaṇa, etc. These terms also

suggest that creation and criticism do not represent two distinct things, they are but different phases of the same thing.

I may at once proceed to draw your attention to the glorious way in which a synthesis was actually achieved between these two phases of the poetic art, namely, creation and criticism. It is the crowning glory of Indian poets and critics that they have realised, achieved and established a synthesis between these two phases. What may be regarded as the *ego* and the *alter-ego* of the same art was synthesised in a beautiful way and this synthesis was vividly envisaged both in theory and practice by several Indian poets and critics like Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The last of these eminent authors indicates this beautiful synthesis in the opening verse of his Dhvanyālokalocana:

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकलां
जगद्ग्रावप्रख्यं निजरसभरात्सारयति च ।
क्रमात्प्रख्योपाख्याप्रसरसुभगं भासयति तद्
सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ॥

The secret of poetic genius, its full truth, consists in at once being a *poet* and a *critic, kavi* and *sahṛdaya,* in the synthesis of the creative art and critical art. Herein lies the great secret.

Who is a *sahṛdaya?* It is not the historical type of critics, nor the biographical type of critics, but the type of neo-critics above referred to, that

answers to the *sahṛdaya* described in Alaṅkāra śāstra. *Sahṛdayas* are critics whose hearts are attuned to the work of art and this attunement is the result of a certain kind of discipline and this discipline involves constant study and constant appreciation or criticism and constantly moving in an atmosphere favourable for the growth of genuine literature.

येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

Dhvanyālokalocana, p. 77, KSRI. edn.

From what has been said so far, it will be found that Indian poets and critics have achieved a great synthesis between poesy and criticism, a synthesis which forms the key to the proper understanding of the course of Indian poetry and criticism. You may now be able to appreciate the significance of the remark which I made at the outset—

कविताबुधयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोरिव ॥

Now you may proceed to link up this introduction to the main parts of the subject. I propose to persuade you to believe that Sanskrit literature and literary criticism contain very valuable information about what I would not hesitate to characterise as the highway of highways of literary criticism. What more do you require than this, the synthesis that I have referred to between the two aspects of the poetic art under consideration, the creative

side and the critical aspect? In this synthesis you can find not only the key to the scheme of my theme, but also the greatest highway of highways of literary criticism. I have not hesitated to characterise it as the *highway of highways of literary criticism,* because it is a synthesis which is coming to be accepted by the modern critics. To say this, in these days, would act as a charm, an important charm. For the exponents of neo-criticism in the West, after so many decades of several thinkers and writers groping in the dark, it was reserved in the twentieth century to emphasise the value of this synthesis, of following the synthetic method of criticism, and of realising the importance of the unity between the two phases of art—namely creation and criticism.

In India and in Indian culture, I may at once tell you that the concept of *synthesis* has always played a very important part. It furnishes you with the key to so many problems relating to Indian poetry, to Indian philosophy, to Indian religion. The glorious achievement of Indian philosophy consists in its synthesis. In recent times all speak of the warring creeds and warring religions in India; particularly politicians of modern times take advantage of a reference to such things. But behind all these apparently warring creeds and religions, one could easily see that Indian culture always stood for synthesis, which formed as it were a fortress in which our culture has been securely enshrined and has always kept itself safe. Even sectarian writers and poets are

anxious to emphasise this kind of synthesis everywhere. Take for instance, the great poet Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, who has worked up a beautiful synthesis between Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism and Śāktism.

यदेतद्वामाङ्गं घनजघनकेशस्तनभरं
कदाचित्तच्छंभोः भवति कमलाकौस्तुभधरम् ।

Nīlakaṇṭhavijayacampū II. 20.

This synthesis then is our great achievement in the field of religion and philosophy and it is no less such in the realm of art. In prehistoric times, as also in historic times, there was always an endeavour to synthesise the two types of art, Indian and alien, to accommodate them in the same fold and our historical monuments bear ample testimony to this spirit. And it is this Indian spirit in favour of synthesis that is responsible to-day for the tolerant attitude which India is taking in political matters. Indian culture is always in favour of synthesis.

If you study the history of Indian culture, you will always see that its keynote is synthesis, which, in the realm of spiritual knowledge, was so beautifully worked up by Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣṇa in his Bhagavadgītā in expounding the Yoga śāstra of the Gītā. In the sphere of art and art-criticism you can similarly see a glorious synthesis of two important phases of culture, namely, creation and criticism, creative art and art criticism.

SECOND LECTURE

Yesterday my endeavour was to persuade you to believe the truth that Art could find its *alter-ego* in Art itself and the underlying synthesis between creative art and art criticism, between the two phases of *pratibhā* and how it was achieved both in theory and practice in ancient India by her great poets and critics. It was also there indicated that this synthesis—the glorious synthesis between the *kavi* and the *sahṛdaya,* which was dimly perceived in this land was first definitely achieved by Vālmīki and later worked up by succeeding generations of poets and critics and allowed to culminate in the master critic Abhinavagupta. To-day it is my endeavour to carry you further and I propose to persuade you to believe that sanskrit literary criticism has achieved still another glorious synthesis in the realm of art. If the synthesis I have already described to you is the highway of highways in the field of literary criticism, to-day I shall speak to you about the synthesis of *law* and *liberty.*

I am here tempted to read out a well-known passage from one of the greatest of the modern poets, whose imaginative vision is all-comprehensive and thoroughly Indian—I mean Rabindranath Tagore. "When we come to literature we find that though it conforms to rules of grammar, it is yet a thing of joy, it is freedom itself. The beauty of a poem is bound by strict laws, yet it transcends

them. The laws are its wings, they do not keep it weighed down, they carry it to freedom. Its form is in law, but its spirit is in beauty. Law is a first step towards freedom and beauty is the complete liberation which stands and shines on the pedestal of law."* The passage referred to is prose-poetry and in a telling and beautiful way, it points out the synthesis between literary law and literary freedom.

How is this synthesis between law and liberty achieved? It is achieved through a particular doctrine of literary criticism; the achievement of this synthesis has been rendered possible by the recognition and acceptance of the principle of *vyañjanā*—suggestion, though true it is that the acceptance of this principle has led to a number of wooden classifications in Sanskrit literature. What is this *vyañjanā*? In technical language it may be described as an extraordinary significative power which all works of art possess. In its narrow sense, what do we understand by it? Yesterday I referred to the dictum laid down by Benedetto Croce, the replacement of the concept "all art is expression" by the concept "all expression is art". We have now to remind ourselves of it. In one sense, even from the point of view of the ordinary speaker, even an ordinary sentence has some artistic element in it, and it is the result of the inherent artistic capacity that every intelligent being possesses. This idea is developed by a modern scientific writer

* Sādhana, Realisation in Love, pp. 98-9, Macmillan & Co.

Jespersen in a thrilling manner in a recent work of his *The Philosophy of Grammar*. In all speech, he says there are three distinct things—expression, suppression and impression. It is important to note that impression is often produced by suppression also and suggestion, he says, is impression through suppression. Boredom we have when there is only expression, but it is only a question of degree. You cannot come across any human being of average intelligence, being such a hopeless bore as to express everything. One cannot do it. One has always to suppress something and the greatness of great writers and great speakers is said to lie in the larger or greater degree of suppression. This idea could easily be illustrated by a commonplace example. We go to the railway station and standing at the counter say "Please, a second class ticket to Annamalainagar". Even here there is a large amount of suppression. This helps us to realise the full meaning of the definition given by Jespersen that suggestion is impression through suppression.

Vyañjanā is suggestion, that is, suggestion in poetry; and it often means more than that. Poetry comes from a principle of suggestion. Even in ordinary sentences the element of suppression cannot be avoided. This truth was long ago recognised in India by the Naiyāyikas, who in their anxiety to be absolutely precise by expressing everything have become real bores and everywhere they inflict their hopeless boredom. They are precise, they want to measure thought quantitatively and so use

the various and varied formulas* such as *avaccheda*, *avacchinna* etc., and in every sentence of theirs these formulas are used to the best of their ability, so that they might express everything they want, and leave no scope for carrying any impression through suppression. Even they, however, cannot escape from the inevitable nature of language. In spite of their formulas, there is yet a residual element in a sentence which refuses to be expressed—the residual element of artistic sense inherently available in every being. Now let us illustrate this position. Taking an ordinary sentence, let us enquire whether it expresses anything which is not expressed by its constituent elements. That is to say, does the sentence express anything over and above the meaning of the words which compose the sentence? The answer is inevitably 'yes'. The relation between the various words is unexpressed and the question naturally arises, how is this idea conveyed? *Saṁsarga* they say is *vākyārtha*. How is this *saṁsarga* conveyed? It is mysterious and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In sentences we have a juxtaposition of words and the element of the relation between the words is conveyed, we have to say, by suppression; in other words, the essential part of every judgment is conveyed by suppression. Now the question is, how is this conveyed? The philosophers are not artists and naturally they have strongly differed from the

* These formed the subject of a course of lectures of Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri—Thought-measuring Devices in Indian Dialectics—delivered under the auspices of the Madras University in 1929.

Alaṅkārikas and vehemently criticised their principles. They accept *saṁsarga* but they say that *saṁsarga* is not something suggested and would hide their answer by a technical expression *'saṁsargamaryādayā avabhāsate'*; and this element they later describe as the element of suppression in conveying judgment. The life of speech consists in this suppressed element and the greater the life that art has, the greater is the suppressed element in it. Alaṅkārikas have developed the scheme of suppression. From all this we come to understand that *vyañjanā* is not the peculiar discovery of critics, and that it is a principle accepted and recognised by every student of philosophy, of logic and of language. It is a principle raised to the rank of a special principle, an important doctrine in the realm of literary appreciation. Poetic art is a superior kind of art and in this art, this principle is employed to a very large extent and the acceptance of this principle renders possible the synthesis beeween *law* and *liberty*. In the first place, it is easily seen that this establishes a sort of connection between expression and impression, between the speaker and the hearer. On the other side, this principle can be developed in the light of a second equation. On the one side there is the artist's mind, the aesthetic sense of artistic expression and on the other there is the art itself. There is also a third equation, the reader or the *sahṛdaya*. And the synthesis may be connected with these three important factors. On the part of the artist, there is much scope for anticipatory imagination, and on the part of the *sahṛdaya* there is scope for antici-

patory realisation. Now what is the connecting link or relation between the two? It is the poetic expression and this may be described as a bridge which carries the art from the *kavi* to the *sahṛdaya* and this bridge is composed of the element of suggestion.

Law in the sphere of poetic art reduces itself to the numerous literary rules. In the same sphere, *liberty* is to be understood as the principle which determines the free play of the artist's genius. What harmonises the attitude of the poet and the attitude of the critic is *vyañjanā* or suggestion; in the absence of this suggestion either art will groan under the weight of the doctrines of literary appreciation or it will run riot. In this way, the principle of suggestion may be understood to establish a synthesis between *law* and *liberty*.

In this connection we may also profitably consider another matter. This principle has also made it possible to achieve a beautiful synthesis between the two important factors of life, speech and thought, sound and sense. In the ancient poetic literature and in the works of old Ālaṅkārikas, one could easily see the great importance attributed to this syuthesis between *śabda* and *artha*. The ancient Indian culture looks upon *śabda* and *artha* as an inseparable pair representing the father and mother of the world. The simple maṅgala-śloka with which Kālidāsa opens his immortal epic, Raghuvaṁśa, is very significant in this direction, very forcible and telling. It is not to be misunderstood, as the verse of a Vaidika introduced without

a purpose. It suppresses, conceals behind it a very great truth for artists and critics. Here the greatest literary artist of India pays homage to the symbol of *śabda* and *artha* in the world and seeks to obtain that adequate appreciation of that ample and full synthesis between sound and sense, an appreciation which every genuine artist must possess. The phrase "*vāgarthapratipattaye*" does not merely connote the acquisition of the words and their meanings—this is a very small thing which could easily be acquired through *kośas* as in olden days and through dictionaries as in modern days. Here the poet is seeking to equip himself with that important synthesis of sound and sense which every literary artist must have. Without this synthesis, a genuine artist cannot produce a genuine work of art.

Genuine poetry is always looked upon as spontaneous emanation from a *rasa*-filled heart. A beautiful thought clothes itself in a beautiful garb without any conscious effort on the part of the poet. This is the highest test of true poetry. Another writer, Bhavabhūti, remarks:

लौकिकानां हि साधूनामर्थं वागनुवर्तते ।

ऋषीणां पुनराद्यानां वाचमर्थोऽनुधावति ॥

Uttararāmacarita, I. 10.

It is an oft-quoted, probably a hackneyed verse, but it embodies a great truth. Consider this verse in the light of the point of view we have been emphasising. The underlying idea is the complete harmony betweeen sound and sense. Sense is always


aggressive; and in the hands of an ordinary man, it shapes its language. But in the case of gifted people, gifted artists, sense follows sound. The term 'ṛṣi' is to be understood in the sense of a gifted artist. Another gifted literary critic who is said to have been a teacher of Abhinavagupta, I mean Bhaṭṭa Tauta, remarks that *kavi* and *ṛṣi* are synonyms. "नानृषिः कविरित्युक्तम् ". Prophets and poets are made of the same stuff and their vision is identical. Shelley remarks that painters and poets would not fail to apprehend this vision How is this effected in poetic expression? It is, as I have already stated, by the principle of *vyañjanā*. The secret is suggestion. Sound and sense cannot be harmonised except through suppression. Mechanically speaking, that is purely from the linguistic point of view, it would mean that the two could not be harmonised. The relation between *śabda* and *artha* has been and is a riddle and the difference becomes accentuated when this great principle is forgotten. Articulation is the result of certain adjustments of the speech mechanism, and sense is quite different from this. Thus organically the two cannot be harmonised. It is the artistic instinct of suppression that serves as the connecting link, bridges over the gulf between the two entirely distinct things, *śabda* and *artha*. Thus in this field also we find that this principle is very important.

This now leads us to a consideration of certain other principles representing certain other highways of literary criticism. We are aware of the fact that literary art or an expression of literary art

involves two important aspects—*form* and *content*. Every artist has to pay special attention to literary form and literary content. Now what is literary form, and what is literary content? This again leads us to the old synthesis of *śabda* and *artha*. What is literary form? Indian critics have analysed literary form and they have laid down that this consists of *śabda* and *artha*, or *śabda* and certain types of *artha*. Ordinary words grouped in an artistic way with some ideas, that is, *vākyārtha*—primary sense—constitute form. This alone, of course, will not do. It must be bright, free from defects etc. The other elements associated with form are technically referred to as *guṇas, alaṅkāras, rītis* etc. The term *alaṅkāra* stands for decorative devices. *Guṇa* is a term untranslatable. It is not merely quality or merit, but something more; a new *rūḍhi* must be established before these words could be accepted. *Rīti* cannot again be identified with style merely. This is a very vague term. Does it refer to ways of grouping words or thought? It is not very clear. In a general way *rīti* may be equated with style, for both are vague. I have devised a pedantic phrase which is probably the nearest approximation to the ideas expressed by the term *guṇa*, ways of collocation; collocation of ideas or sense and of words approaches *guṇa*. It must be remembered that it is not merely collocation of words and ideas referred to here but the artistic collocation of artistic *śabda, artha*, absence of defects, presence of brightness, *rīti, guṇa* and *alaṅkāra*, these constitute literary form.

Now what about content? The sense which is beautiful, the sense that is charming constitutes content. A careful examination of our great works of art and our views and modes of appreciation would reveal this important fact—on one side the various aspects of form synthesise, and on the other the various aspects of content synthesise. And this has been rendered possible by the doctrine of *dhvani* which sums up the synthesis of all conceivable modes of literary appreciation.

औचितीमनुधावन्ति सर्वे ध्वनिरसोन्नयाः ।
गुणालङ्कृतिरीतीनां नयाश्चानृजुवाङ्मयाः ॥



Block lent by Dr. V. Raghavan.

The above-mentioned graph will form a key to the whole position. *Dhvani, rasa* and *unnaya*, these three stand for three important schools of thought in Sanskrit literary criticism. *Dhvani* is *vyañjanā*. *Rasa* is a highway of criticism not only for Indian literature but also for the study of European literature, a sure and certain method. Emphasising *rasa*, one school accepts *dhvani* or suggestion, while another school accepts *rasa*, emphasising *unnaya*. *Dhvani*, the latter say, is a sort of inference, a quick anticipatory way of inference. These three run after *aucitya*. *Guṇas, alaṅkāras* and *rītis*, these are emphasised in special ways. Are *rītis* and *guṇas* different? They are recognised as different in Alaṅkāra śāstra. *Anṛjuvāk* means *vakrokti*. This also runs after *aucitya*.

The graph also represents their historical interrelation. The bigger circle encloses the bigger triangle which stands for *aucitya* which may be termed as 'adaptation' to be understood in its philosophical sense. Adaptation is understood in this sense as standing for the perfect harmony which parts bear to each other and to the whole. *Dhvani, rasa* and *unnaya* or *anumāna* obviously refer to the literary content, i.e., artistic thought, whereas *guṇas, alaṅkāras* and *rītis* refer to the literary form.

Now what is *vakrokti*? Some have translated it as eccentric expression. This is a monstrosity. In a simple way, it may be understood as deviation in expression from the commonplace. This deviation may be due to various causes, but when the deviation is effective, it is termed *vakrokti*. On

the side of expression, the inner circle refers to *vakrokti* and *guṇas*. *Alaṅkāras* and *rītis* are comprised within it. *Aucitya* represents the great synthesis of *rasa, dhvani* and *anumāna* and what is more, both form and content. *Rasa, dhvani* and *anumāna,* because they deal with a sphere of content, are bigger, more important, more comprehensive than the sphere of form.

If speech fulfils its purpose, there ought to be some amount of suppression. Hence naturally thought is wider than speech. Philosophically also this is true. If one must be thinking, he must think in language. If this be so, and so far as we know it is so, can it be said that thought and speech are co-extensive? We have seen what the answer should be. And Indian metaphysicists hold that thought is always wider, more comprehensive than speech. If this is so in ordinary parlance, it is expressly and definitely so in the field of literary art. As a fiction, they are taken as co-extensive in one field, that is the field of law, both ancient and modern. The Mīmāṁsakas assume that thought and form are co-extensive. But it remains only an assumption; in actual practice this view is always given up. The assumption is that *vidhi* is straightforward न विधेा परः शब्दार्थः : this is an attitude that is totally inimical to literary criticism. In this field, we accept that thought is always wider than form;* if not, the world would have been

* 1. This is signified in the graph by the triangle of rasa-dhvani-unnaya representing content, enclosing within itself vakrokti, rīti, guṇa and alaṅkāra, representing form.

deprived of the pleasure of art; in the field of art, they are never co-extensive. This great synthesis of form and content is the greatest of our achievements in the realm of art and that we have been able to achieve through the doctrine of *vyañjanā*.

The graph also helps us to understand the various highways of literary criticism. *Rasa-paddhati* is the oldest and the most permanent; the most imperial highway of literary appreciation, the way of the great critic-artists Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, the way of the great art-critics, Bharata, Ānanda-vardhana and Abhinavagupta. Historically also this is true. For if Vālmīki is the father of poetry and criticism, *rasapaddhati* becomes the most ancient highway of literary appreciation. *Dhvani* and *anumāna* are placed side by side at the base of the triangle, because one cannot call one older than the other. The leading exponent of the *dhvani* theory presupposes the *anumāna* theory and criticises it. It appears therefore possible that these two highways must have existed coevally. Mahimabhaṭṭa is not the discoverer of *anumāna paddhati*. In the inner triangle the same historical sequence is observed. Bhāmaha, the oldest Ālaṅkārika available emphasises *alaṅkāra*, while Daṇḍin and Vāmana emphasise respectively *guṇa* and *rīti*. These two authors are not far separated in time and therefore they are placed in the foot of the triangle. Further Bhāmaha throws out valuable hints regarding *vakrokti*, even though it was reserved for Kuntaka to systematically develop it.

According to Bhāmaha, literary form and thought consist of *vakrokti*:

> सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
>
> Kāvyālaṅkāra, II. 85.

Thus it will be found that the *vakrokti*-synthesis which is less important only than the *aucitya*-synthesis is older than the three other literary forms, *guṇa*, *alaṅkāra* and *rīti*.

From my remarks yesterday, you should have easily gathered that we prepared ourselves to move along the highway of *vyañjanā.* We also equipped ourselves with a graph towards the end of the last lecture which would enable us as a guide, more or less as a typographical guide, on the highway of *vyañjanā* and would enable us not to miss the prominent things and not to miss particularly the links which connect the byroads or the byways with this highway. Tonight I propose to amplify certain remarks I made about the principles of *vyañjanā.*

In fact, it may be regarded as the central principle of literary criticism in Sanskrit, it may be regarded as the pivotal doctrine round which the whole scheme of art-criticism in Sanskrit revolves. Now what is the secret of this principle? In a prosaic way, as I told you yesterday, it may be rendered by the term 'suggestion'; and as to what suggestion is, I would like to remind you of the definition given by Jespersen: "Suggestion is impression through suppression." It is the suppressive element that is important in suggestion. We should also remind ourselves in this connection of the general principles laid down by Croce that all expression is art, not only poetical expression but all expression is art. One cannot, however low may be one's civilization or culture, provided one is equipped with some medium of expression, one cannot get away from being an artist in framing sentences. Now the principle of *vyañjanā* is suggestion in poetry. Is it that

which is not fundamentally different from the principle of suggestion in a sentence, is it merely the suggestion that we see in ordinary sentences? It is not merely that. It represents the centre of charm in poetry, the soul of charm in poetry and so it is not merely the suggestion we find in ordinary sentences. Then what is the secret of the force of *vyañjanā* as an artistic principle? I refer to the suppressed element in the case of suggestion. Why should there be a suppressed element at all even in ordinary sentences? We wish to create a minimum degree of interest possibly in the minds of hearers. Without interesting the hearers to some extent at least, we cannot create anything like a desirable impression on the minds of the readers. Even to attract attention, a minimum degree of interest we should provide, and the element of suppression is necessary. Now this element of supression may be enhanced in its value, this element of suppression may be intensified, may be improved upon in various ways; in poetic expression, it is this element of suppression and the principle of suggestion that rests upon it that prove all important. In fact it was discovered in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D. by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that this is the centre, the source of poetic charm. Well, what is the secret of this attraction? What is the secret of this force? Some people would say that there is an element of novelty in *vyañjanā* or suggestion. The suggested idea is envisaged with a certain degree of novelty. What is suppressed and let out, and what is suppressed and suggested may appear novel, may appear new

or may be envisaged with a certain outlook of freshness for the time being. Is it this element that is the real source of attraction? I do not think it is the real source of attraction. It is suggested by a Sanskrit writer that there is scope for some sort of intellectual quest in the process of *vyañjanā*, quest provided it leads to conquest; and intellectual quest in *vyañjanā* certainly leads to some conquest. Now these two things, quest and conquest, are enough to create some interest. Well, is it because of the scope for quest and conquest that we have in *vyañjanā* that it proves to be attractive? There is some truth in this explanation but it is not the whole truth. The same idea is expressed in some works on Sanskrit poetics in another way. Something is concealed for the time being; and concealing for a moment and withholding from your view might tend to enhance the degree of charm; like distance, concealing and withholding might lead to enhance its charm: *gūḍham sat camatkaroti*. Like the charms of an attractive beauty which do not obtrude upon notice in an immodest way, but which are presented through a veil and in a properly concealed fashion, like the physical charms of a modest beauty then, the suggested element when it is presented, when it is disclosed after some degree of concealment, proves to be attractive. This is also true to some extent. But it is only a poetic way of presenting the other explanation. There is scope for quest and conquest here. But the fact is, as far as I have been able to gather, that *vyañjanā* makes it possible for art, for every suggestive art, to re-live its life in itself through a purely

artistic process and to find its fulfilment and consummation in a definitely artistic purpose. That is the secret of the force of the whole charm of *vyañjanā*.

This requires amplification, and an amplification of this statement may involve a review of the whole literature on Sanskrit poetics from the point of view of *vyañjanā*. We may take a long and comprehensive view of the whole literature from this standpoint. Let us take this statement in parts and proceed to consider it. *Vyañjanā* is a wholly suggested, a wholly artistic, process. Can we not say that it is an intellectual process? Yes, in the language of the logic-ridden phraseology of the Ālaṅkārikas. Or can we not say in the technical sense of the logicians that it has a power attracted towards it? All these technicalities could be introduced in the course of a discussion of the nature of *vyañjanā* and of a discussion of its place in art criticism. We have to remember in this connection one important fact. Such a view would enable you to see how to study in detail the learned criticisms in the Alaṅkāra śāstras and also how to study in detail all the discussions of relevant topics of this principle, namely *vyañjanā* in art criticism. Many of you may be familiar with the learned arguments that are adduced to show that *vyañjanā* or suggestion is not the ordinary *prima facie* significatory power which words possess. It is not the primary power by virtue of which words or expressions or phrases or sentences convey their *prima facie* meaning. Well, in a majority of instances we are

even using expressions in a secondary sense, we are using so many words in a secondary sense. And can we not bring *vyañjanā* or suggestion under the category of some secondary significatory power? Secondary significatory power is a sort of fiction which we have introduced in the philosophy of interpretation for purposes of convenience, the result of the superimposition of a certain subjective aspect made intentionally and consciously by the subject upon the expression that is used. You find a certain statement made and some phrases are loosely used, some expressions do not admit of strict interpretation, and consistently with the context, consistently with what you know about the intention of the speaker, and consistently also with the general aim that is kept in view, you interpert and you seek to correctly interpret and to interpret him generously and favourably. Hearers are always supposed to be generous, except probably those who are to consider or interpret law. Other hearers are always supposed to be generous. A certain amount of generosity in interpretation is necessary in all inter-communication of thought. Life will not be worth living, if every hearer should insist upon exact precision and exact accuracy in every statement that you make in ordinary conversation. In writing even, it is possible only with due limitations. Now under such circumstances in order to find out the intention of the speaker, we take some of the phrases loosely used by him in a certain sense which those phrases do not primarily possess. Some hackneyed examples are cited in this connection. Take for instance a hamlet on the Ganges—we

interpret it as a hut on the banks of the Ganges. Well, in such cases consistently with the context you reinterpret such phrases in a different way and the interpretation which you put upon them is attributed to some secondary significatory power which the phrase is supposed to possess. Well, can *vyañjanā* or suggestion be brought under that? No; the reason is this: you deliberately resort to a certain process of interpretation, because you feel some difficulty in understanding the phrase in its literal sense. The phrase used cannot be construed strictly and your conscious experience of some hitch or difficulty is at the root of the secondary interpretation that is adopted. That is what I mean when I say that it is a sort of fiction which you create for purposes of interpretation. That is not suggestion. Behind that, however, there is another element. Well, fancy for a moment that the speaker who uses such a phrase uses it in that way with a purpose and in a deliberate manner, not as a result of some lapse. As it is, he deliberately uses the phrase then in a secondary sense. You are not justified in assuming that the speaker is a fool or thinking loose, that he has not got sufficient control over language to make himself intelligible in a direct and straightforward manner. You assume that he is a master of language. Under these circumstances there must be some object, some purpose the speaker must have in view in adopting this secondary mode of expression. He must have something in view, some purpose or *prayojana* in view. What is it he wishes to suggest? He wishes to go a step further on the path of suppression. He wishes to conceal

from the point of view for a little while a certain idea and at the same time he wishes that that idea should be understood in an agreeable way. It is in this context you can easily see what the idea might be. As it is, the speaker wishes to suggest that the hut is pure, it is holy because it is situated on the bank of the river Gaṅgā and it is very close to it, As it is, he wishes to emphasise the idea of the proximity to the river and so many other things that may be associated with its close proximity. That element is left to be gathered from the context and that element is left to be suggested; that element is not conveyed for the moment by the expression itself. This is *vyañjanā*. This gives rise to a furious controversy in the philosophy of Alaṅkāra śāstra between the Ālaṅkārikas and the logicians. Well, why should not this element be brought under inference? It may be the case of an agreeable type of inference. Call it inference or call it suggestion, you cannot say that it is a regular type of syllogising, you cannot say that it is a regular type of syllogistic inference, you may treat it as a sort of immediate inference. A degree of mediacy is an essential feature of inferential process. Mediacy is the characteristic feature of inference and here in suggestion one feels that the degree of mediacy that is necessarily characteristic of inference is wanting, and we feel that there is a certain degree of immediacy which does not entitle us to bring it under inference. As a result, this process is taken to be a process associated with artistic expression itself but not with an ordinary process; it is taken to be an extreme

process and it is described by Ālaṅkārikas as *lokottara*. In the course of the technical discussion of the nature of this *vṛtti*, one is apt to forget the essential characteristic of the process called *vyañjanā*. One is likely to be carried away by the glorifying description of the character of *vyañjanā*. It is an extraordinary process. Abhinavagupta exalts this process as something extraordinary.* Why is it *lokottara*? The simple idea behind the phrase *lokottara* is this—it is essentially an artistic process; it is not a *laukika* process, it is not a process of the ordinary life, it is not the inartistic process with which we are familiar in this work-a-day world in our everyday task—it is an essentially artistic process. That is why it is described by the Ālaṅkārikas as a *lokottara-vṛtti* and it is an artistic process for various reasons.

To appreciate adequately why *vyañjanā* should be regarded as an essentially artistic process, you have to look at it from various points of view, and I propose to help you in looking at it from certain points of view. It is an essentially artistic process as it involves suppression, not of the everyday type but of the agreeable type. It is an essentially artistic process because it gives us an impression, not the ordinary commonplace impression which sentences give, not the impression of the craftsman-like or mechanical type but a delicate impression described as artistic thrill. It is an essentially

* See Locana, KSRI. edn. pp. 105—132.

artistic process because it enables you to feel that you have done with certain matters with which students of Alaṅkāra śāstra are already familiar. It enables you to feel that you have done with the compartmental slicing of Sanskrit literature into literary genera such as epic, lyric, the material, the non-material and so on. It enables you thus to feel that you have done with this sort of compartmental slicing up of literature and it enables you to take the right view of poetic art and view it as an organic and complete expression and put the right question which you should put to yourself in matters connected with literary production. Well, what is the right question which you should put to yourself? The question to be put is not what is the type under which it should be brought, not whether it conforms to certain time-honoured traditional classifications recognised by the classical school of critics, not whether it conforms to rules deduced from such classification, not whether it conforms to the dead weight of the technique—that is not the right question to put, but the right question to put is what this artistic specimen expresses and how far it expresses it well and artistically? That is the right type of question to put. This point of view was emphasised adequately for the first time by certain Kashmirian critics under the leadership of Ānandavardhana, a great exponent of the *dhvani* school. Prior to Ānandavardhana critics were carried away by the excesses of classification in Sanskrit literary criticism. Ānandavardhana flourished in the later part of the 9th century. If anybody before Ānanda-

vardhana investigated and envisaged the fruitfulness of this principle, namely the principle of suggestion, and vividly realised the importance of this principle being raised to the rank of the central principle of literary criticism, it was Vālmīki himself, the father of Sanskrit poetry, and Kālidāsa who followed Vālmīki in so many respects. Among the professional writers on literary criticism in Sanskrit, there is sufficient evidence to show that none clearly realised the importance of this principle before Ānandavardhana. This artists realised; the art critics were unconsciously biased in favour of this principle and they unconsciously recognised the importance of this principle but they never intentionally did anything to popularise this principle, to elucidate it and to explain and illustrate it; and we owe this great contribution to the genius of Ānandavardhana, that great artist and art critic.

It was he who inaugurated a certain way of classifying specimens of poetic art on the basis of this principle; in fact, it was he that was responsible for the re-classification of poetic expression under three heads. The three heads in Alaṅkāra literature are not very suggestive except to those who are familiar with the implications behind the names. The names are *uttama, madhyama* and *adhama*. Thus anybody who proceeds to classify, if he wishes to be satisfied with a simple classification, is attracted by the convenience which the three-fold division affords in every branch of knowledge, in Philosophy, in Logic

and in other branches of knowledge also—the two extremes and something to represent the middling. Well, that is convenient and it is this convenience that induced Ānandavardhana to adopt this tripartite division. You should understand the implications behind this division of art as *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*. That specimen of poetry should be regarded as the best specimen, *uttama*, which allows the suggested element to reign supreme; it never lets itself to be subordinated to anything else—that should be regarded as the *kāvya* of the best type. What about *madhyama kāvya*? That specimen in which the suggested element is not raised to the supreme rank, is not allowed to reign supreme, and is either co-ordinated with some other element or subordinated to it but is at the same time allowed to preserve its minimum degree of agreeableness and beauty and attractiveness—that is regarded as the *madhyama*. And then there are certain specimens of art which may be described as the result of amusing diversion in which poetic geniuses indulge either at the stage of practice or even after reaching the stage of perfection as a sort of amusement. They are readily described as lifeless *citras* in poetry and such specimens give prominence only to certain attractive features of literary form, and under such attractive features the beautiful suggested element is allowed to lie buried. Well, that is regarded as *adhama*.

Ānandavardhana himself suggests that this re-classification is only a tentative device which he has suggested as a challenge to the traditional

classification of literature into various genera, to the traditional method of compartmental slicings and cuttings. He indicates how the unity of poetry could be preserved by fixing your attention upon the central principle of *vyañjanā*. You make it the leading principle of art criticism, adopt it as the source of literary charm and you can use it as a magic wand. If you wish to appraise better you can do so, you can do so without giving offence to anybody and you can do so to your own advantage. In that way, in this scheme he proposes to provide the world of readers with a convenient and flexible scheme of classification. It is a scheme which should not be adopted as a rigid scheme of classification by students. Some commentators and some traditional writers who came after Ānandavardhana were labouring under the misapprehension that he intended that this scheme should be adopted as an inflexible or rigid scheme of classification. Sometimes great masters provide the world with certain devices, and these devices are misused. Great artists provide the world with certain devices and with certain materials, and their followers come to attach greater importance to the material than to the purpose itself. In that way, later writers, in the spirit of cavilling critics, proceeded to find fault with Ānandavardhana for giving an elastic or unnecessarily flexible scheme of classification which involves a lot of overlapping. It is not for purposes of a strict classification that Ānandavardhana provided the world of readers with this scheme. He never intended it to be a logical scheme. His scheme of classifi-

cation is not intended to satisfy the demands of strict logic. It is more a challenge to the traditional process of slicing and cutting. It is more a challenge to the tradition-ridden critics. In that way, we have to understand; and he himself makes it clear towards the end of his work. He indicates how this scheme could be re-arranged and could be-re-exhibited in a slightly different fashion.

Take for instance what is known as the excellent specimen and compare it with what, in a technical sense, may be brought under *madhyama kāvya* or a specimen of the middling type. Compare these two, you will find that you are likely to feel that Ānandavardhana has done a grave injustice to these two types. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to two specimens.

सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषास्त्रयः ।
शूरश्च कृतविद्यश्च यश्च जानाति सेवितुम् ॥

This was brought under the first class. The suggestion is allowed to reign supreme here. Three classes of people are able to gather gold, as one would be able to gather flowers wherever they go. They are in prosperity everywhere. That is the suggested idea. Who are these three classes of people? (1) The brave person, the courageous person, one who is endowed with genuine valour, (2) the scholar who has stuied well and who has assimilated what he has studied and (3) one who knows how to serve one's master. These

three classes of people, wherever they go, thrive well. Now the simple idea that is suggested is that they meet with prosperity everywhere. That is not expressed in a straightforward way. That is certainly a suggested idea. That is allowed to reign supreme and for that reason it is *uttama kāvya* and so comes under the first rank. Now place it on one side and compare it for instance with another beautiful specimen which is likely to be brought under the technical *madhyama* type.

अनुरागवती सन्ध्या दिवसस्तत्पुरस्सरः ।

अहो दैवगतिः कीदृक् तथापि न समागमः ॥

The evening twilight is endowed with *rāga,* is endowed with red colour. Her lover, the day, goes before her and quite close to her and love is reciprocated. What a fatality it is that they never come together! They are so anxious to marry each other, they are so anxious to be completely united with each other, but their desire is never allowed to fulfil itself and is never realised. The obvious meaning here is the relation between the *Sandhyā* and *Divasa* and behind it there is a suggested idea. The suggested idea is the relation of two lovers who reciprocate each other's love but who are never allowed to be united with each other. Such a relation is described by the prince of Indian poets, by Kālidāsa, as reaching the supreme moment of the most spiritual aspect of love.* It is that aspect of

* Mālavikāgnimitra III. 15, Anāturotkaṇṭhitayoḥ, etc.

coming together and separation, of complete reciprocation without fulfilment or consummation, it is this that represents the supreme spiritual moment of love. The supreme spiritual moment of love does not consist in the carnal consummation that follows. And students of *rasa* know that *śṛṅgāra* or love is essentially spiritual as conceived by Indians and in Indian culture. It is never carnal, it may be exhibited in certain external aspects, it may look like something connected with the carnal aspect. It is yet always spiritual, and the essential feature of love is self-effacement and not self-aggression, not self-aggrandisement. The Indian conception of love is never to possess and is always to efface oneself and to forget oneself. That is why it is raised to the rank of a vehicle which can freely reach to God. Now in this aspect of love one could find something very attractive. Those who are sufficiently responsive to *rasa* cannot miss the central idea in the suggested part of this verse. But still what is the position of that suggested idea? It is assigned a somewhat subordinate rank. It appeals certainly far better and with greater force than the idea on the surface. That is true. But what is the rank that is assigned to it? The intention of the poet is to describe *Sandhyā* and *Divasa*; from the context you have to assume that. In describing *Sandhyā* and *Divasa,* he has produced a work of art. A work of art, the moment it leaves the artist's hands, is the property of art-critics. We are not at all bound to interpret art in the same manner in which the artist himself intended it to be interpreted. That

is the way of every good work of art, but still when we pay some attention to the context and so long as we are alive to the details of the circumstances under which this particular specimen of art was produced, we are hopelessly in the grip of historical criticism; and so long as we are within the grip of historical criticism, we have to realise that the position that is assigned to the suggested element is a subordinate position. Though we know from the circumstances of the case that the artist intends to present the idea beautifully, he seeks to present it by linking it up with some situation, with some spiritual situation, and it is very attractive. In that way he uses more or less as a decorative device the suggested element behind the *prima facie* sense. When we review the above classification, we can legitimately say that some injustice is done to this specimen. Compare it with the first verse. It has got a didactic element in it; it is an ennobling specimen; but ethics no longer regulates the standards of literature; it is the moral standard that regulates literary appreciation here. How to meet objections of this type? How to remove this injustice? Ānandavardhana himself indicates how you might remove this apparent injustice.

There is another way of looking at the whole matter, and Ānandavardhana himself in this connection was readily understood and interpreted by a learned critic, Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha. He suggests a sort of amendment to this classification. In suggesting an innocent amendment, he

does not improve upon this classification but simply brings out what Ānandavardhana himself sought to explain towards the end of his work. This division recognises four classes instead of three—*uttamottama, uttama, madhyama* and *adhama*. Bring it at least under uttama; just for the fault which the poet has committed in reducing the suggested element to a subordinate rank, he has to pay some penalty, and instead of calling it *uttamottama,* reduce it to the rank of *uttama*. But we may be excused when we refuse to take into consideration the circumstances under which the poet himself might have produced this specimen from the aesthetic point of view which the art critic has to adopt. Now when we proceed to review this and when we proceed to re-examine its character, it appeals to us and sometimes it appeals to us with greater force than specimens of the first type. Ānandavardhana himself towards the close of his work indicates the reason. The reason which he gives is this: Behind all this, there is an element of *rasa*. On the surface, so long as you are in the grip of historical criticism, you may be able to reach only the suggested element. But behind all this there is an element of *rasa* and it is this path of suggestion which leads you to the inner shrine. When you go there, you forget what you found outside and you lose yourself in it. Then it is not *madhyama*. This idea is again expressed, elucidated and beautifully exemplified by Paṇḍitarāja. The beauty consists in its pathetic appeal to the *sahṛdaya*. Specimens like this appeal in a pathetic way to responsive minds. What is the cause of

this pathetic appeal? Says he: *dāsyam anubhavad rājakalatramiva* (*Rasagaṅgādhara* p. 17). The whole pathos is to be found in the imprisonment of the suggested idea. What is the cause of the pathetic appeal in a queen who is in prison, of a glorious powerful empress who does not deserve to be thrown into prison and who is imprisoned for the moment, who is placed in the wrong place—the whole pathos of the situation, the whole appealing force of the situation, is to be found in that it is a queen that is imprisoned there. It is the suggested idea, it is the suggested element that is imprisoned in the external. The spiritual force of the pathetic appeal of a great person who is thrown into prison can be easily appreciated at this moment, for instance, when we think of the Yerawada Jail. This suggestion or *vyañjanā* enables you to see that the right question to put is not what rules does the work of art conform to, but what has the work of art expressed, and how is it expressed.

This will be, friends, the concluding lecture of the short course which I undertook to deliver under the auspices of this University. I would request you to march on, to continue to march on through the highway of *vyañjanā* or artistic suggestion. You will have an opportunity to see its full abiding promise, and it will enable you to see many more things. I have to remind you of what I said the other day about the nature of the artistic process called *vyañjanā*. *Vyañjanā* or artistic suggestion is a process which makes it possible for art to re-live itself in a purely artistic way and to find its fulfilment and consummation in a genuinely artistic purpose, namely *rasa*. We were able to consider certain aspects of this matter yesterday. I would again repeat that *vyañjanā* is a superior type of artistic process because it enables you to feel that you have, or can very well afford to have, done with the formal distinctions of *guṇas, alaṅkāras* etc. It enables you to effect a synthesis of all these formal elements in *vakrokti*. In one word, it enables you to synthesise law and liberty. Now you will see how it enables you to synthesise law and liberty. In literature, it is very difficult to unify these two things. One of the greatest modern Indian literary men, the greatest of Indian poets, Rabindranath Tagore, indicates the way in which law and liberty could be synthesised in literature. I quoted an extract from his writings the other day, and I would ask you to remember a bit from that extract.

With the true vision of a prophet, with the comprehensive vision, the true insight of a poet, he has indicated the way in which law and liberty could be synthesised; and Indian Ālaṅkārikas, exponents of literary criticism in Sanskrit, have also indicated how law and liberty could be synthesised in literature through the artistic process of *vyañjanā*.

In this connection I have to ask you not to be carried away by the glowing tribute which I paid the other day to the exponents of the modern impressionistic school of literary criticism. The exponents of this modern school have, indeed, done a great service; but it should be remembered that the leading exponents of the school played the role of iconoclasts in regard to literary traditions and endeavoured to break all the ideals of classicism. One can easily see that they have committed a mistake in going to one extreme. They have committed the mistake of supposing that complete liberty could be achieved by throwing away all laws, all rules, all conventions and all traditional restrictions. The impressionistic critic fails to realise that laws are the wings of poesy, the wings of artistic liberty or artistic beauty. What will be the fate of a bird which seeks to soar higher and higher with full liberty, with unrestricted liberty but which burns its wings? That would be the fate of the school of literary criticism which strives to burn away all traditions and seeks to soar higher and higher and run away from all classical or traditional movements. Indian art critics, with the help of all the

accumulated wisdom of an age-long artistic culture, endeavoured to synthesise law and liberty and have successfully effected a synthesis through the artistic or aesthetic process of suggestion. They do not treat *guṇa, alaṅkāra* and *rīti* as so many inhibitions, they do not treat them as so many astrological formulae, they do not treat them—as one follower of the impressionistic school would do—as the prattling of chambermaids, they do not treat them as the dull drone and sing-song of school mistresses. They do not treat them as so many blind alleys, but byways which could be connected and linked up with the highways of literary criticism. In order to appreciate the significance of these remarks, you have necessarily to pay some attention to the conception of *guṇa* and *rīti* and *alaṅkāra* in Indian Alaṅkāra literature. There is a comprehensive statement regarding *guṇa* and *rīti* given by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*; and this statement is based upon the *vyañjanā* theory, the theory of suggestion. Allow me to read a small extract.

द्विविधं चारुत्वम् – स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठं, संघटनाश्रितं च । तत्र शब्दानां स्वरूपमात्रकृतं चारुत्वं शब्दालंकारेभ्यः, संघटनाश्रितं तु शब्दगुणेभ्यः । एवमर्थानां चारुत्वं स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठमुपमादिभ्यः, संघटनापर्यवसितं तु अर्थगुणेभ्यः । Locana p. 41. KSRI. Edn.

Guṇas are certain features associated with the *collocation* of ideas and words; and *alaṅkāras* are allocated to concepts and to words as such, but not to the *collocation* of concepts nor to the *collo-*

cation of words. *Alaṅkāras* contribute to literary charm, *guṇas* also contribute to literary charm, but they all contribute to literary charm only on this condition being satisfied, that the artistic process of *vyañjanā* or the artistic suggestion is preserved in tact. *Rīti* simply represents a collective and vague name of a group of *guṇas,* and the equivalent of *rīti* in English is style in its broad and comprehensive sense.

Now then with the help of the graph which I explained the other day, it should be possible for you to see how these aspects of literary form were emphasised in varying degrees by several critics. These may be regarded as constituting the byways of literary criticism, and their existence, or the excuse for their existence, chiefly consists in their being correlated to the suggested sense, or to the suggested element, in an appropriate manner. Thus the process of aesthetic and artistic suggestion known as *vyañjanā* connects together all the byways and leads to a synthesis being established between law and liberty. You may consider a few examples, a few specimens from Sanskrit literature, and you may see how in these specimens it is the element of suggested sense or it is the artistic process of suggestion that really represents the vital element of the life of poetry; and the law, external law, has much to do with certain rules dealing with *guṇas, alaṅkāras and rītis*; but if you are asked to say what it is that really serves as the source of charm in these examples you will say that it is not *guṇa,*

alaṅkāra or rīti but the vital element or artistic suggestion. Take, for instance, a beautiful verse which I have selected from one of the pious devotional lyrics produced in India. I am referring to Mūka and his Pañcaśatī. One of the well-known verses describing the charm of the goddess Kāmākṣī of Kāñcī runs thus:

राकाचन्द्रसमानकान्तिवदना नाकाधिराजस्तुता
मूकानामपि कुर्वती सुरधुनीनीकाशवाग्वैभवम ।
श्रीकाञ्चीनगरीविहाररसिका शोकापहन्त्री सता-
मेका पुण्यपरम्परा पशुपतेराकारिणी राजते ॥

Stutiśataka 11.

Mūka must have been in a somewhat play-mood when he composed this verse. He uses a good deal of alliteration and you see here some alliterative jingle. But what is the real element of charm? What is it that really constitutes the source of charm? On the surface, in the external form, there is a sort of alliterative jingle, which in lesser hands might have produced a very undesirable effect, namely the repetition of the sound 'Kā' which is introduced here with the greatest possible artistic skill. But what is it that really serves as the vital element in this piece? It is the element of *bhāva*, his devotional attitude that is suggested behind and that is embodied in this apparently alliterative form. And here some aspect of the law relating to form is satisfied; but at the same time,

through the help of the artistic process, the poet has allowed himself full liberty to soar as high as possible in a certain direction. Or again you will consider another extract from the same work which cleverly uses the figure of speech, turn of expression:

तव त्रस्तं पादात् किसलयमरण्यान्तरमगात्
परं रेखारूपं कमलममुमेवाश्रितमभूत् ।
जितानां कामाक्षि द्वितयमपि युक्तं परिभवे
विदेशे वासो वा शरणगमनं वा निजरिपोः ॥

Mūkapañcaśatī, Pādāravindaśataka 85.

The tender sprouts that are usually famous have certainly become afraid of your tender feet and have taken shelter in the interior of forests. The lotus, on the other hand, which is equally afraid of the charms of your feet, has not run away but has transformed itself into the *padma-rekhā* and has taken shelter under your feet. Vanquished people will do well to resort to one or the other of these two devices, either running away to some other place or prostrating themselves before the feet of their victorious enemy. The technique of Alaṅkāra śāstra would enable you to use some labels in describing the figures of speech that are employed in this verse. But what is the vital element that serves as the source of life, source of charm? It is the attitude of devotion that is suggested by the artistic process of *vyañjanā*. Let me give you another instance; it is simpler and it may appeal to all:

धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे
न चापलमयामहे भवभयान्न दूयामहे ।
स्थिरां तनुमहेतरां मनसि किञ्च काञ्चीरत-
स्मरान्तककुटुम्बिनीचरणपल्लवोपासनाम् ॥

Mūkapañcaśatī, Stutiśataka 85.

It is not merely the attitude of devotion and resultant state of perfect repose, peace and tranquillity that is suggested. "We do not take delight in wealth, we do not care to serve wicked people, we do not allow our minds to stray away from the right path, from the path of rectitude, we are not afraid of *saṁsāra,* and we need not run away from our house, from society, from the world; we constantly meditate upon the tender feet of the Mother of the world and live upon the permanent sustenance we derive from our devotion to Her feet." Well, on the surface a suitable form could be seen; it is doubtful whether the idea has clothed itself in the form or the poet intentionally used this form in order to emphasise the idea. In supreme moments of spiritual poetic realisation like this, the poet's devotion-filled heart would have enabled the idea to find a suitable form for itself, without any conscious effort on his part.

And in another place, the same poet soars far high into the region, into the sphere of literary form, but not intentionally. He simply describes a beautiful smile of the Goddess; at one stage, in one supreme

moment of realisation, he fancies that he is given the privilege of seeing the smile of his Mother, of the World-Mother, Kāmākṣī.

आलोके तव पञ्चसायकरिपोरुद्दामकौतूहल-
प्रेङ्खन्मारुतघट्टनप्रचलितादानन्ददुग्धाम्बुधेः ।
काचिद्वीचिरुदञ्चति प्रतिनवा संवित्प्ररोहात्मिका
तां कामाक्षि कवीश्वराः स्मितमिति व्याकुर्वते सर्वदा ॥

Mūkapañcaśatī, Mandasmitaśataka 98.

"What is your smile? Poets describe your smile as beautiful; but what is it? At the sight of Śiva, a breeze of excitement creates a ripple on the surface of the full ocean of love, bliss and intelligence which you represent, and from that immense ocean of blissful love a small ripple comes out, and that ripple is seen outside as smile. Poets fancy that as your smile." A turn of expression, a figure of speech, is employed here. But it is not wantonly used or intentionally used in a perverse manner to make a beautiful idea groan under it, to suffocate a beautiful idea.

It is the poet's fervour that enables him to find suitable language for his expression; and what is it? It is all the result of the process described as *vyañjanā* or suggestion, and it is through the help of this process that poets have been able to lose themselves in the central or vital elements and get at the core of a certain idea and then allow that idea to clothe itself in a suitable garb. Thus

one can easily see through examples like this that the artistic, aesthetic process of suggestion called *vyañjanā* would enable one to synthesise law and liberty. Take, for instance, one verse from Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava:

तां प्राङ्मुखीं तत्र निवेश्य तन्वीं क्षणं व्यलम्बन्त पुरो निषण्णाः ।
भूतार्थशोभाह्रियमाणनेत्राः प्रसाधने सन्निहितेऽपि नार्यः ॥
VII. 13.

It is easy and appears to be a simple description of *svabhāva*. You can also bring it under some turn of expression. What is the idea that is suggested here? In the simplest fashion possible, the poet employs certain turns of expression, and the form is also perfect, and the artistic feature of ideal beauty called *lāvaṇya* is suggested here. The term *lāvaṇya* in Sanskrit literature is a very significant term. As compared with that term, I cannot help feeling that the term 'beauty' is prosaic. Do not connect the term *lāvaṇya* with *lavaṇa* or salt. It has nothing to do with it. *Lāvaṇya* here means that whole physical frame and all its parts appear to float as it were on an ocean of brilliant beauty or brilliant charm.

प्लवमानमिवाभाति यदङ्गं कान्तिपाथसि ।
मनःप्रह्लादजननं तल्लावण्यमिति स्मृतम् ॥

It does not require the help of any decorative device, it does not require the help of *alaṅkāras* or embellishments. It is that kind of *lāvaṇya* that is suggested here by the poet Kālidāsa in describing the charms or beauty of Umā.

Let us turn our attention for a while to the technical literature dealing with the byways. The other day in the course of my explanation of the graph with which I provided you, I referred to Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha and Vāmana as the chief exponents of important phases of literary form. Such of you as might have studied the works of Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha and Vāmana can easily see that the various byways which they have developed in their works are all sought to be linked up with the highway of *vyañjanā* or artistic suggestion. I am not going to enter into the technical details discussing these works, but I am going to concentrate my attention upon the simplest elements that could be chosen from these works. Now let us see what Bhāmaha does. He lays special emphasis upon *alaṅkāra*; certainly he lays particular emphasis upon *alaṅkāra* or figure of speech, but at a certain stage he forgets himself. What is it? What is *alaṅkāra*? After all, it is a turn of expression. Strictly speaking, all *alaṅkāras* or fiugures of speech or turns of expression should be brought under what is known as *vakrokti*. Well, when is a turn of expression really beautiful? When it is properly used, when it is used with an eye on propriety in poetry. What is ideal poetry, what is perfect poetry? He gives a very simple definition.

शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम् ।

Kāvyālaṅkāra I. 16.

Sound and sense put together constitute poetry. This idea is further amplified by a later day exponent of the school of *vakrokti*, Kuntaka. He was

himself an eccentric writer, but as a leading exponent of the school of *vakrokti,* he did a great service. What is meant by *sāhitya*? Probably the word *sāhitya* is based upon this use of the word *sahitau*. The term *sāhitya* may be freely rendered by the English word *composition* but it is not all kinds of composition but a particular kind of composition that is referred to here. Kuntaka explains the meaning of the word *sāhitya* which consists in sound and sense,—he does not say in perfect harmony with each other,—but he says vying with each other. Sound and sense in genuine poetry vie with each other for suppression. He leaves this idea to be gathered from his work. Though he came forward to write his work as an avowed opponent of the *dhvani* school or the school of suggestion, in an implicit manner in several places in his work, he acknowledges his allegiance to that school; and he gives some instances, in which you can easily see how it is suggestion that is its central idea. If the degree of *sāhitya* or harmony of sound and sense vying with each other, that should be maintained at a high level, does not sometimes happen to be maintained, the suggested element suffers on that account. And he cites an instance from Mālatīmādhava:—

असारं संमारं परिमुषितरत्नं त्रिभुवनं
निरालोकं लोकं मरणशरणं बान्धवजनम ।
अदर्पं कन्दर्पं जननयननिर्माणमफलं
जगज्जीर्णारण्यं कथमसि विधातुं व्यवसितः ॥

V. 30.

The context is that a Kāpālika seeks to do away with the heroine, and that context shows that it is a moment of supreme excitement, for a great treasure, representing the all in all of the hero, is about to be wiped out, and in that connection these phrases are used. "How is it that you have dared to deprive the whole universe of this essence, the three worlds of this most beautiful, most precious gem, the whole world of this life?" And then there is a fall. Is there any consistency? There is bathos, as it were. He has not got up the degree of *sāhitya* or the vying with each other or the harmony that is necessary to bring out the suggested idea; and the artistic process itself, to that extent, is detracted, and so the whole phrase is spoiled and some amendment is suggested by the critic. We can easily gather from this that Bhāmaha and his followers like Kuntaka, if not explicitly, at least in an implicit manner but in an unmistakable way, seek to link up their methods with the highway of artistic suggestion or *vyañjanā*.

Now let us proceed to Daṇḍin, who was one of the younger contemporaries of Bhāmaha. He begins with an eloquent tribute to the best specimen of style and to the *guṇas* which constitute the vital elements of style. In the course of his exposition of the various *guṇas* at one stage he waxes eloquent about a particular *guṇa*, namely *samādhi*. This *guṇa* has played a great role in poetic art not only in our country but in other countries as well. What is it, what does it consist in? It is a simple idea. It consists in representing something

in the garb of something else, one idea in the garb of another; rather in modern phraseology, it can be taken to stand for what might be described as a sort of verbal heterophemy; but that is not more expressive than the term *samādhi* itself. You can easily find out its nature from an example.

कुमुदानि निमीलन्ति कमलान्युन्मिषन्ति च ।

Kāvyādarśa I. 94.

"Blue lotuses go to sleep, close their eyes and red lotuses wake up." Waking up and closing their eyes are features which are usually associated with living beings, not with flowers. We do not usually speak of flowers going to sleep. In language it is an interesting study to see what proportion of our expression consists of metaphors, conscious or unconcious. Modern linguists have made that study and have indicated how metaphors play a very large part in the make-up and development of a language. It is human instinct in composing a sentence to resort to the process of artistic suggestion through the suppressed element; it is equally a human instinct to use this *guṇa* called *samādhi*. It is not differentiated from metaphor in English books, and, in a loose manner, it may be brought under metaphorical expression. But in Sanskrit literature, you have got a better and nicer classification, and it is brought not under metaphor but under a certain *guṇa* called *samādhi*. Well, that is why I say that the technical word heterophemy is the closest approach to *samādhi*. We have to introduce some technical terms though they might be somewhat

pedantic, to indicate in an accurate manner some of these corresponding ideas. And with reference to this *guṇa,* what does Daṇḍin say?

तदेतत् काव्यसर्वस्वं समाधिर्नाम यो गुणः ।
कविसार्थः समग्रोऽपि तमेनमनुगच्छति ॥

Kāvyādarša I. 100.

I would even suggest an amendment, it plays a very large part. To the extent to which we are all using this, to that extent at least we are all artists. Daṇḍin lifts this to the highest rank possible among the *guṇas.* What is the principle involved in it? He does not explain that. These earlier Ālaṅkārikas by their silence towards *vyañjanā* were able to pay a more eloquent tribute to the artistic process of suggestion than the later Ālaṅkārikas, and the manner in which they emphasised the artistic process is very significant.

कविसार्थः समग्रोऽपि तमेनमनुगच्छति ।

The whole world of poets cannot help making use of this; and not a single poet can avoid using this. If the vital element in the artistic process of suggestion is concealment and withholding for a while to make it possible for you to go through some sort of thrilling exercise of quest and conquest in the sphere of art, this is certainly a feature which involves the artistic principle of *vyañjanā.*

And then let us come down to Kuntaka himself and his *vakrokti*. He makes up his mind to take a diverse attitude towards the principle of *vyañjanā*. He wishes to develop his byway, the byway of *vakrokti*. What is *vyañjanā*? Are you not prepared to recognise the process called suggestion? Yes, we have to recognise it but we can bring it under some other category. He is more frank and in his frankness he writes himself down; to the extent to which he has accepted this attitude and temper against the principle of artistic suggestion or *vyañjanā*, to that extent he has written himself down in the history of literary criticism in Sanskrit; and he proposes to bring *vyañjanā* or suggestion under *upacāra-vakratā*, a sort of secondary turn of expression and this secondary turn of expression is used by him in a very elastic way and in a very comprehensive sense. Figures of speech, like metaphor, simile and such others are capable of suggesting *rasa* through the help of this principle called *upacāra-vakratā*, some secondary process;

यन्मूला सरसोल्लेखा रूपकादिरलङ्कृतिः ।
उपचारप्रधानासौ वक्रता काचिदुच्यते ॥

Vakroktijīvita II. 14.

He is not prepared to extend his vision a little bit further and see whether there is not behind this secondary something, some artistic process called *vyañjanā* or suggestion.

So in this way, if you examine the technical literature dealing with these byways, you will easily see that their writers must all have paid a tribute, if not expressly, in an implicit manner, to the principle of *vyañjanā* or suggestion. And the Dhvanikāra, the leading exponent of the principle of suggestion, has shown how through the help of this principle, you can gather together all the scattered byways and link them up with the highway of suggestion, provided you recognise the broad principle, another broad principle, called *aucitya* or 'Adaptation'. What is *aucitya*? In the Dhvanikāra's view, *aucitya* is not moral propriety. As I explained its meaning the other day, it would be better to render it by the philosophical equivalent 'Adaptation' which consists in the fitness of parts to each other and to the whole. Not only that; he goes a step further; he would emphasise the idea that *aucitya* or Adaptation consists in the fitness of parts not only to the whole, but to the inner soul, the vital element, also. He is responsible for the oft-quoted dictum in the Alaṅkāra śāstra:

अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद्रसभङ्गस्य कारणम् ।
प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥

Dhvanyāloka III. P. 145.

And proceeding along these lines, it must be possible for you to realise how law and liberty, traditional rules representing byways of literary criticism, and the artistic suggestion to which I have referred as one of the most important high-

ways,—how they could be synthesised; and so, I hope that this principle, namely *vyañjanā,* has made it possible for the students of Indian literature and the students of literary criticism in Sanskrit not to fall into the error of the impressionistic critic and not to throw overboard all laws, all rules, all restrictions. It will not do to cry down laws, rules and restrictions; we must remember that they all constitute the wings of poetic art. You may refine the wings as far as you can, but you cannot cut away the wings and try to soar high. Any kind of liberty in any sphere which seeks to have a complete abolition of all laws and rules will result in anarchy and will only lead to destruction. That is why the genius of Indian culture is always in favour of equating liberty with law and harmonising liberty with law. Unrestricted liberty, Indian culture is not in favour of allowing in any sphere.

There is another direction in which the highway of *vyañjanā* would be particularly helpful; and, if you wish to realise how broad it is and how fruitful your effort will be if you take yourself along this highway to some literary goal, you will have to pay some attention to this aspect of the matter also. You know that there is a great controversy in literature and literary criticism regarding the aim of poetic art and the aim of all art. What is the aim of art? Pleasure-seekers say that pleasure is the aim of art; moralists say that some moral lesson or moral profit is the aim of art; and some seek to combine these two things, pleasure and profit and say that both should be regarded as the aim

of art. What is the aim of poetic art? Is it merely to instruct you, to please you, or to do both? Romantic criticism emphasises the idea that beauty is its own excuse for its being. That is true and that argument must appeal to most of us, students of literature, very strongly. All of us are responsive to the attractions of beauty. We must be prepared to recognise the fact that beauty is its own excuse for its being, and no critic of authority now seriously endeavours to test literature by moral standards, by standards of ethics. It is sometimes stated by some critics that ancient Indian critics did not realise this aspect of literary criticism in an adequate manner. That is not true. What ancient critics have sought to do is this: through the help of the artistic process of the principle called *vyañjanā*, they have certainly developed an ideal which is consistent with this attitude, with the attitude just now described, with the attitude of the modern exponents of romantic criticism that beauty is its own excuse for its being. In fact, one of the greatest writers emphasises this idea in a beautiful way. I am referring to Ānandavardhana. In the course of his exposition of the principle of *dhvani* at a certain stage, he does not hesitate to condemn Kālidāsa in very strong terms for what he considers improper on the moral side. For instance, he condemns Kālidāsa in unmistakable terms for the somewhat frank and open way in which he has described the *sambhoga śṛṅgāra* of the Mother and Father of the world, Pārvatī and Śiva in the eighth canto of the Kumārasambhava. He should have stopped with seven cantos. Consummation of

love between Pārvatī and Śiva should have simply been indicated, it should not have been described in detail. He considers that the poet forgot himself and committed an outrage, and considers the poet's behaviour outrageous and in so many terms he condemns no less a poet than Kālidāsa himself* and his admiration for Kālidāsa is very great. In one place, he remarks that he would recognise only three poets, Vālmīki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa.† He refuses to recognise any other poet. This is his attitude towards Kālidāsa but still he does not hesitate to condemn him. Now when he speaks of the importance of the artistic process of suggestion at the very beginning of his work, he gives a number of instances. The first two or three instances which he has given are of a low moral tone. What is his object? He wishes to demonstrate the forces of the principle called *vyañjanā*. The suggested element may be associated with the greatest depravity, and it may be very bad from the moral point of view; from the moral point of view it may be very objectionable, still beauty is its own excuse for its being and the beautiful suggested element has its own excuse for its being. You cannot help recognising that. You can condemn it, you need not encourage it in society, you can never recommend it, but still it is its own excuse for its being. You cannot avoid recognising it. That is a fact, physical, physiological, psychological fact; and that is an aesthetic fact and you

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* *See* Dhvanyāloka, III. pp. 137-8.

† *Ibid.* p. 29.

cannot help recognising it. And it is the real reason why he opens his work with such objectionable specimens, specimens which would not bear free rendering or free translation in any other language. Well, that is the way in which he emphaises the importance of *vyañjanā*. At one stage, he realises a certain type of supreme selflessness, undifferentiated bliss in the form of what he calls *rasa*. Proceed along the path or along the high way of suggestion, artistic suggestion, you will reach a point at which you can unify pleasure and profit, you can synthesise the two aims of art and you may lose yourself in pure unalloyed bliss. In that way through the process called *vyañjanā,* a successful endeavour has been made by Ānandavardhana himself and also his followers to synthesise the two aims of art.

This question may be looked at from another point of view. Students of Sanskrit literature are familiar with the analogy that is employed in describing the nature of poetic art. Vedic law is compared to a sovereign master who would only give orders to be obeyed immediately, and *purāṇas* are compared to friends. They also say good things, and they also persuade you to do good things. But what about good poetry or *kāvya*? It confesses its chief aim is merely edification, edification not of an ordinary type. An agreeable edification may, in one word, be described as the aim of *kāvya*; and it is compared to a true loving Hindu wife. She employs only suggestive arts; she does not behave like Bohemian friends; she employs her persuasive art

to the fullest extent, the artistic process of suggestion, to suggest to you what is good and what is wrong. In that way, there is also another direction in which the highway of *vyañjanā* enables you to effect a beautiful synthesis of all the various aims of poetic art.

If you go near the goal of *vyañjanā*, you cannot help considering that as a highway of literary criticism in Sanskrit, which opens up fresh and beautiful vistas to poetic or artistic ambition by immensely widening the bounds of artistic resourcefulness. This requires some amplification. The world of poetic art would have been poorer but for this principle of *vyañjanā*. As Ānandavardhana remarks there would have been only two or three poets in the world; no good poetry could possibly be produced without in some manner or other using some phrases, some expressions and some beautiful ideas in the works of previous writers. In fact, there is nothing new under the sun. After Vālmīki, nobody could have written any Sanskrit *kāvya*. However resourceful a poet, it would have been impossible unless he makes use of this principle of suggestion. And this principle of *vyañjanā* enables you to express a single idea in a thousand ways and in a thousand agreeable ways. And the Dhvanikāra in the fourth chapter of his work waxes eloquent about this aspect of *vyañjanā*:

वाचस्पतिसहस्राणां सहस्रैरपि यत्नतः ।
निबद्धापि क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिर्जगतामिव ॥

Dhvanyāloka IV. 10.

Though thousands and thousands of poets write poetry, the scope of poetic art would in no way be curtailed by that, and the resources of the poet like the resources of mother nature can never be exhausted. Why, what is all this due to? All this is due to a clever and judicious employment of the artistic process called *vyañjanā* or suggestion; and for this reason I am saying that it opens up fresh and beautiful vistas to poetic or artistic ambition by immensely widening the bounds of artistic resourcefulness.

And above all, through the *aucitya*-synthesis or the synthesis of Adaptation, the process of *vyañjanā* leads you on to what might be called the *sanctum sanctorum* of poetic art, the inner shrine of *rasa*. Now the philosophy of *rasa* in Indian poetics is a big topic. However briefly it may be, I should deal with it in the next few minutes. The philosophy of *rasa* is an important branch of art criticism. Some people may fancy that what is known as *rasa* corresponds to what may be described as emotional element in literature. It is not merely that. After a good deal of philosophic speculation and investigation, after several probings and searchings, the exponents of artistic culture in ancient India arrived at a certain well-formulated doctrine of *rasa*, and it was formulated by Ānandavardhana. It was in a way hinted at by Vālmīki, and adopted by Kālidāsa; and the great poet has also embodied the theory of *rasa* in a beautiful verse in a beautiful situation in his master-

piece, the Śākuntala. Let me remind you of the verse:

> रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्
> पर्युत्सुकीभवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।
> तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं
> भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥ V. 2.

It is introduced by Kālidāsa in a beautiful situation. It is a simple verse. Duṣyanta is introduced as the hero who has cruelly forgotten his love. There is nothing to make him unhappy and he does not remember anything unhappy. Still, he feels perturbed, agitated on hearing sweet music. He is not only a king or a sovereign or a lover, but from the point of view of the aesthetic art he is also perfect. That is one of the phases of Duṣyanta's character. He is a great moralist and he is a highly virtuous king, both in theory and practice; he has mastered all the scriptures and he is a strictly righteous king. These represent some features of his character. He is himself a bit of a poet and also a bit of a critic and he is a great painter. He combines in himself all artistic excellences and he makes these remarks. A person is happy to all outward appearances; still he feels perturbed on hearing some sweet music. What it it due to? He feels perturbed and agitated; he falls a victim to some sort of melancholy on seeing objects of beauty. He is not able to recollect anything; perhaps he recalls to his mind without being con-

scious of it the abiding impressions of previous attachments, of attachments of previous births; and in explaining this verse, Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the Nāṭya śāstra indicates how every one of us, with a minimum degree of culture, should be taken to have inherited certain abiding impressions.

जातमात्र एव हि जन्तुरियतीभिः संविद्भिः परीतो भवति । तथा हि 'दुःखसंश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादनसादरः' इति न्यायेन सर्वो रिरंसया व्याप्तः, स्वात्मनि उत्कर्षमानितया परमुपहसन्, अभीष्टवियोगसन्तप्तः तद्धेतुषु कोपपरवशः, अशक्तौ च ततो भीरुः, किञ्चिदुज्जिगीषुरपि अनुचितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्मकतयाक्रान्तः किञ्चिदनभीष्टतया अभिमन्यमानः तत्तत्स्वपरकर्तव्यदर्शनसमुदितविस्मयः किञ्चिच्च जिहासुरेव जायते । न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति ।

Abhinavabhāratī, *GOS*. I. p. 284.

All these instincts are inherited; all of us are pleasure-seekers in varying degrees and our first impulse is to laugh at our neighbour. One of the German philosophers, Kant, describes this impulse in a somewhat peculiar way. Nobody has got an instinctive liking for another person who is superior to himself. Every person instinctively dislikes subordination to somebody else. The human soul is instinctive with its love of liberty. It is encaged in a prison; and we are encaged in our environments, in our own society. There are so many physical, social, political and academical fetters. We

cannot allow this soul to give vent to its instinct freely and to have full liberty and, as Kant points out, it dislikes subordination. And what is the proof which he gives? Well, carefully observe how a man behaves when he sees a certain person slipping down on a rainy day on the road. His first impulse is to laugh. Of course he may be a very good man. He may be able to exercise a good deal of self-control, and he might have developed also scouting spirit to that extent and run up to that man in distress and help him. But what is his first impulse? Well, this is a proof of the fact that nobody likes subordination and so everybody has got an inherited instinct in favour of the comic element. Then the instinct of sorrow is also implanted in you; the fact of losing something makes you sorry. Well, there is the instinct of disgust. You feel disgusted at the things you do not like. Then there is the instinct of wonder; when something wonderful is presented to your vision, the instinct of *vismaya* or wonder exhibits itself. There is also the instinct of *śānti*, that belongs to the God in man; that instinct on the one side and the instinct of love on the other side, these two instincts represent the god in man. Love and *śānti* or tranquillity, these are also inherited. Well, we are believers in our past existence; we are also believers in post-mortem existence. Our existence is not restricted to the existence of the present physical frame, we do not believe that our physical frame is our soul. If we existed before now, we are going to exist for ever; and it is this belief in the immortality of the personality, in the previous existence

and also in the post-mortem existence of the personality—it is this that is responsible for the elimination of the technical tragedy from Indian literature. There is nothing ending with sorrow. Sorrow or grief may be the dominating element, but to end with sorrow is impossible. If your soul really lives for a time in sorrow, it must come out of it in a more energetic way. That is responsible for the elimination of what is known as the technical tragedy from Indian literature. This idea is very well expressed by Vālmīki himself, not through precept but through example. Complete pessimism is unknown to Indian culture. Sometimes people, in their mistaken zeal for certain modern ways of alien philosophy, proceed to condemn Indian systems of philosophy as being pessimistic in their tone. *Karuṇa* is the dominating element in the Rāmāyaṇa; Vālmīki develops it in various ways.

Now these instincts referred to are the abiding impressions which we have all inherited in varying degrees. Now what does poetic art do? Through the process of suggestion, you are enabled to realise the development of one or the other of these abiding impressions; and at a certain stage, these common instincts are associated with the abiding impression called love. But at a certain stage, through the help of the poetic art, it is developed in a certain fashion; and it comes out envisaged with an artistic garb which comes to be divested of all its worldly associations; it comes to be divested of all its individualistic connections; at a certain stage you forget it is either associated with you or with the ob-

ject of your love, with the hero whose part is represented on the stage or with the heroine. And at that supreme moment, your heart, through the help of the process of *vyañjanā* or suggestion, becomes attuned completely to this principle, namely love and you lose yourself in it. You become completely absorbed in it and, at that stage, a certain blissful condition is experienced. Now philosophers and metaphysicians break their heads about this bliss, whether it is positive in its character or negative. But for all ordinary purposes it is enough if you remember that it is a stage of complete blissful absorption.

Now this theory has got important artistic implications. It is the result of Indian artists and art critics proceeding along the highway of *vyañjanā*, and it is the goal which they have reached. In Indian literature, this has enabled Indian critics to solve an important and difficult riddle: What is the real source of appeal, what is the real cause of appeal in sorrow? That is not yet fully explained; various explanations are attempted. At that stage, at that supreme moment, you forget yourself, and some universal element is revealed. That is the real secret of the whole affair. It is not only that. Even in the comic aspect, you forget yourself. Now in the *rasa* theory, you find an explanation for this riddle. It is described as a blissful condition, because at that stage your mind forgets all its ordinary associations. Now through the help of a theory of this kind, it has been possible for Indian art critics to demonstrate all the

great possibilities of the highway of *vyañjanā*. Now if you follow up a further highway, namely the highway of *rasa,* it will lead you to splendid results. Can it be described as a highway, one may ask. Once on a certain occasion in the course of a private talk, one was tempted to remark that if it was a highway, it might be described as a subterranean highway. That is not a subterranean highway. If you are prepared to indulge in exaggeration, it may be described as the empyrean highway; but without any exaggeration, I may tell you that *rasa* is not the empyrean highway but an essentially human highway, if you can easily connect it with your own instincts.

In a way, I have come to the end of my task. If synthesis is the watchword of Hindu religion and culture, and if synthesis is the watchword of the Hindu ways of life and ways of thought, and, if it is the watchword of Hindu civilization, I may at once tell you that it is the watchword of Indian art also. As I indicated in my first lecture, it is the synthesis of the artist and the art critic, the synthesis of the poet and the responsive critic, the synthesis of criticism and genius, it is this synthesis that may be regarded as the highway of highways in Indian literary criticism. And I cannot more appropriately conclude this course than by repeating the verse with which I began:

परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।
कविताबुधयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोरिव ॥

To the divine synthesis of *Śivā* and *Śiva,* to the mother-father synthesis, to the woman-man synthesis, I pay homage, just in the same spirit and in the same breath, I do homage to the synthesis of poesy and criticism, of charm and response, of genius and taste, of poet and critic, of *kavi* and *sahṛdaya*.

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